I am struggling to understand what Schopenhauer could mean by his definition of free will. Unfortunately, he doesn't give examples or put the way he uses the term in context, so I suspect Wittgenstein would have some difficulty accepting that it is truly meaningful.
I have recently been watching the excellent videos on the philosophy faculty website:
http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/podcasts/general_philosophy
In part 5 Peter Millican touches on free will a few times, in particular in relation to the mind / body dualism debate. He makes a very interesting analogy. If we try and think about ourselves in terms of a computer, we have hardware (which explains our physical actions in terms of cause and effect) which extends to the physical and chemical constituents of our brains. We also we have software, which is analogous to our minds.
We cannot fully explain our minds by just talking about physical properties or causation. Using this analogy I would maintain that our minds are programmed in such a way that we are free to make moral choices and decisions. I can't explain why this is the case, but I certainly do believe that it is the case.
I think looking at the way we use the words "free will" helps, but Schopenhauer seems to be looking for a metaphysical explanation of what free will is, whereas explaining the terms by how they are used seems to be edging towards an epistemological explanation.
Is it possible to answer metaphysical questions by looking at the philosophy of language?
Friday, May 25, 2012
Monday, May 21, 2012
Schopenhauer and murder
Schopenhauer says we are free to act according to motive (which seems to be self evident) but we are not free to choose our motives because these are determined. His argument is very circular and I guess that is the point since he is trying to prove that we cannot establish free will by introspection.
Whether he is a determinist or not (he could be a soft determinist), I certainly reject the idea that all motives are "caused" by something. I think some motives are "willed". This is not to say that there aren't reasons why we have different motives, again that seems to me to be self evident.
Maybe I am redefining will in terms of "reason for acting" rather than "cause for acting". If we look at it that way, we can see how some actions are not "caused" but are the result of a rational process.
If we take an example - someone asks you "why did you kill that fly?"
There are two ways of looking at this question:
1. what is your motive for killing that fly?
2. what is your reason for killing that fly?
On the first interpretation, I accept that the motive is that I found the fly irritating.
However, my reason for killing the fly is not that I found the fly irritating. My reason (in a moral sense) is that I found the fly irritating and I made a moral assessment that I was entitled to end the fly's life because I don't believe that killing flies is wrong in the current circumstances.
My choice to kill the fly was a moral choice, an exercise of free will and it involved reason as well as motive. Anyone who says it isn't, and is just motive, doesn't seem to be capturing what is going on. They stop their analysis too soon.
Whether he is a determinist or not (he could be a soft determinist), I certainly reject the idea that all motives are "caused" by something. I think some motives are "willed". This is not to say that there aren't reasons why we have different motives, again that seems to me to be self evident.
Maybe I am redefining will in terms of "reason for acting" rather than "cause for acting". If we look at it that way, we can see how some actions are not "caused" but are the result of a rational process.
If we take an example - someone asks you "why did you kill that fly?"
There are two ways of looking at this question:
1. what is your motive for killing that fly?
2. what is your reason for killing that fly?
On the first interpretation, I accept that the motive is that I found the fly irritating.
However, my reason for killing the fly is not that I found the fly irritating. My reason (in a moral sense) is that I found the fly irritating and I made a moral assessment that I was entitled to end the fly's life because I don't believe that killing flies is wrong in the current circumstances.
My choice to kill the fly was a moral choice, an exercise of free will and it involved reason as well as motive. Anyone who says it isn't, and is just motive, doesn't seem to be capturing what is going on. They stop their analysis too soon.
Sunday, May 20, 2012
Schopenhauer
There are a number of reasons why I am not willing to agree with Schopenhauer. The fact that I am not willing to agree is, ipso fact, proof that I have free will!
Perhaps there are three types of reasons why I don't agree with Schopenhauer.
The first set of reasons has to do with the logic of determinism. The fact that we can predict an action, even with almost complete certainty, doesn't necessarily mean that the action is determined. I don't accept that, because at the point of action the subject could not have acted differently, determinism is true. If there is a formal possibility of the agent to act in a number of ways prior to the action, then there is the possibility of a non-deterministic explanation. We can envisage a sate of affairs where the agent acted differently.
The second set of reasons is based on what we mean by the term "free will". Schopenhauer says we can "act what we will" but we cannot "will what we will". This is just wrong in my view. My counter argument is effectively that we can "will what we will". We can will what we will because that is what we mean by the term "will". For you to prove that determinism is true you would need to prove to me that humans don't make choices - for me that is the essence of what I mean by determinism, and Schopenhauer has not proved that this is the case.
Of course you can redefine what I mean by free will and then say that reality doesn't accord with that definition, but all you have achieved is to play semantics with the definition.
The final set of reasons is to do with my conception of what it is to be an independent person or conscience. Schopenhauer has come up with one way of looking at human behaviour, but it doesn't cohere with my conception. Following an action back to its cause seems a very odd way of looking at human actions. When we talk about moral or normative human actions we use the concept of choice, we talk about blame and praise and human responsibility. I don't accept that all of these concepts are either meaningless or mistaken. I don't think the concept of causation (on its own) works very well in the realm of human actions. Human behaviour is not mechanistic, that is the essence of being human. What Schopenhauer is doing from my perspective is redefining what it is to be human.
Perhaps there are three types of reasons why I don't agree with Schopenhauer.
The first set of reasons has to do with the logic of determinism. The fact that we can predict an action, even with almost complete certainty, doesn't necessarily mean that the action is determined. I don't accept that, because at the point of action the subject could not have acted differently, determinism is true. If there is a formal possibility of the agent to act in a number of ways prior to the action, then there is the possibility of a non-deterministic explanation. We can envisage a sate of affairs where the agent acted differently.
The second set of reasons is based on what we mean by the term "free will". Schopenhauer says we can "act what we will" but we cannot "will what we will". This is just wrong in my view. My counter argument is effectively that we can "will what we will". We can will what we will because that is what we mean by the term "will". For you to prove that determinism is true you would need to prove to me that humans don't make choices - for me that is the essence of what I mean by determinism, and Schopenhauer has not proved that this is the case.
Of course you can redefine what I mean by free will and then say that reality doesn't accord with that definition, but all you have achieved is to play semantics with the definition.
The final set of reasons is to do with my conception of what it is to be an independent person or conscience. Schopenhauer has come up with one way of looking at human behaviour, but it doesn't cohere with my conception. Following an action back to its cause seems a very odd way of looking at human actions. When we talk about moral or normative human actions we use the concept of choice, we talk about blame and praise and human responsibility. I don't accept that all of these concepts are either meaningless or mistaken. I don't think the concept of causation (on its own) works very well in the realm of human actions. Human behaviour is not mechanistic, that is the essence of being human. What Schopenhauer is doing from my perspective is redefining what it is to be human.
Saturday, May 19, 2012
Schopenhauer and Free Will
There seem to be two types of argument going on. The first is an argument from causality and is almost a reductio ad absurdum. If you accept in principle that everything must have a cause, then you can follow the chain back ad infinitum and never find a starting point. This strikes me as similar to arguments over the existence of the universe and whether something can come from nothing. Although it's an interesting argument, it doesn't really help because I don't look upon free will as a problem of mechanics. I don't accept that all thoughts have to have a single "cause", the process is far too complex to be suitable to that kind of simplistic reasoning.
The second argument redefines free will in terms of human motivations, Schop. says that we choose to do what motivates us most, and that as we don't choose our motivations, we don't in effect have freedom of choice. I also find this argument very unsatisfactory.
My take on free will is that it is neither a question of cause or of motives but is an issue of absence of limitations on our choices. I accept that we all have motivations, but we are also able to have a rational discussion about these and reach a conclusion, and there seems to be nothing to stop us from doing this, other than facing the consequences of those choices.
No doubt most choices are predetermined in the sense that they stem from motivations, but we seem to have the ability to influence our motivations by lending more weight to some than others. We are not just influenced by motivations, we also take into account what the consequences will be and make a rational judgement about the implications of making one choice or another. For me, free will is a conceptual framework which captures this process using two words.
For there to be free will under Schop.'s definition we would need to be able to break the chain of cause and effect or change the laws that govern the universe and I'm not sure anyone really thinks this can happen or indeed is really what we mean by free will.
It seems that there must be a way to define 'free will' not in terms of the cause or motivation for an action, but instead in terms of the ability to assess the consequences of different choices and attribute moral value to those choices. When we couple this with the lack of constraint on this process, we end up with free will. If a rational person or persons make a normative choice which could have been otherwise (i.e. we can easily conceive of them making a different choice) then that choice has a moral value, it is in effect a case of "free will".
The second argument redefines free will in terms of human motivations, Schop. says that we choose to do what motivates us most, and that as we don't choose our motivations, we don't in effect have freedom of choice. I also find this argument very unsatisfactory.
My take on free will is that it is neither a question of cause or of motives but is an issue of absence of limitations on our choices. I accept that we all have motivations, but we are also able to have a rational discussion about these and reach a conclusion, and there seems to be nothing to stop us from doing this, other than facing the consequences of those choices.
No doubt most choices are predetermined in the sense that they stem from motivations, but we seem to have the ability to influence our motivations by lending more weight to some than others. We are not just influenced by motivations, we also take into account what the consequences will be and make a rational judgement about the implications of making one choice or another. For me, free will is a conceptual framework which captures this process using two words.
For there to be free will under Schop.'s definition we would need to be able to break the chain of cause and effect or change the laws that govern the universe and I'm not sure anyone really thinks this can happen or indeed is really what we mean by free will.
It seems that there must be a way to define 'free will' not in terms of the cause or motivation for an action, but instead in terms of the ability to assess the consequences of different choices and attribute moral value to those choices. When we couple this with the lack of constraint on this process, we end up with free will. If a rational person or persons make a normative choice which could have been otherwise (i.e. we can easily conceive of them making a different choice) then that choice has a moral value, it is in effect a case of "free will".
Thursday, May 17, 2012
Free Will by Sam Harris
Philosophy News has posted a relatively short review of Sam Harris' new book 'Free Will' by Paul Pardi. The article goes through some of the key issues which are discussed in the background reading to this week's topic, so I think it may be of interest.
http://www.philosophynews.com/post/2012/05/15/An-Analysis-of-Sam-Harris-Free-Will.aspx
On the whole I am prone to reject philosophical arguments which claim that widely used terms are "meaningless" or "incoherent". My natural reaction is to challenge the author to sharpen their pencil and go back and try a bit harder to understand what we do in fact mean when we use a concept.
I agree with the author of the review that is seems inconsistent to say both that a term is meaningless and that it is false, if that is indeed what Mr. Harris does in his book.
Lawrence
http://www.philosophynews.com/post/2012/05/15/An-Analysis-of-Sam-Harris-Free-Will.aspx
On the whole I am prone to reject philosophical arguments which claim that widely used terms are "meaningless" or "incoherent". My natural reaction is to challenge the author to sharpen their pencil and go back and try a bit harder to understand what we do in fact mean when we use a concept.
I agree with the author of the review that is seems inconsistent to say both that a term is meaningless and that it is false, if that is indeed what Mr. Harris does in his book.
Lawrence
Wednesday, May 16, 2012
Free Will - initial thoughts
Do we have free will?
Yes. There is a significant element of 'nature and nurture' in the way we lead our lives, but we still fundamentally have the ability to make choices between alternative actions. There are laws and conventions which prevent us from taking certain actions - but we can, if we want, break the law or defy convention and then face the consequences.
With respect to which kinds of things do we have freedom?
We are free to decide who we spend our lives with, where we live and what we do for a living. We are free to try and complete our education and to take advantage of the opportunities that are presented to us (which admittedly are not equal). We are free to interact with people in the way we choose - for example we can be polite or rude, respectful or disrespectful, inquisitive or incurious.
There seem to be various types of freedom. The main ones that spring to mind are political, social, economic, religious, moral.
How do we know we have freedom?
Because at a human level I feel free to choose.
At a societal level I live in a relatively free society (in some respects society has become less free over time, in other respects it has become more free). I can weigh up the pros and cons and use rational processes to decide on a course of action. I can reflect on my beliefs and feelings and make a non-instinctive response.
What are the consequences, if any, of our freedom?
We can't always blame external factors when we make the wrong choice if we are free. Freedom brings moral responsibility and accountability. We should therefore educate ourselves to be in a position to try and make the right choices.
Yes. There is a significant element of 'nature and nurture' in the way we lead our lives, but we still fundamentally have the ability to make choices between alternative actions. There are laws and conventions which prevent us from taking certain actions - but we can, if we want, break the law or defy convention and then face the consequences.
With respect to which kinds of things do we have freedom?
We are free to decide who we spend our lives with, where we live and what we do for a living. We are free to try and complete our education and to take advantage of the opportunities that are presented to us (which admittedly are not equal). We are free to interact with people in the way we choose - for example we can be polite or rude, respectful or disrespectful, inquisitive or incurious.
There seem to be various types of freedom. The main ones that spring to mind are political, social, economic, religious, moral.
How do we know we have freedom?
Because at a human level I feel free to choose.
At a societal level I live in a relatively free society (in some respects society has become less free over time, in other respects it has become more free). I can weigh up the pros and cons and use rational processes to decide on a course of action. I can reflect on my beliefs and feelings and make a non-instinctive response.
What are the consequences, if any, of our freedom?
We can't always blame external factors when we make the wrong choice if we are free. Freedom brings moral responsibility and accountability. We should therefore educate ourselves to be in a position to try and make the right choices.
Saturday, May 12, 2012
Mathematical Truth
"The objection I see to Coherentism is that there appear to be some things that won’t change.....2 + 2 will always be 4 regardless of whether we are counting real objects or just imagining them".
This is a really interesting avenue. The "truth" of mathematics is something which I have been pondering. Is pure mathematics something that we discover or is it something that humans invent? If the former, then I can see how mathematics can be taken as a (natural) foundational type belief, if the latter then either coherentist or perhaps rational foundationalist.
If you were to ask most secondary school children who have studied mathematics at a basic level "Is it true or false that the sum of the angles in a triangle always add up to 180 degrees?" I suspect (hope?) most would say it was true. For them, this knowledge would be similar to 2+2=4 in terms of never changing, in a sense it would be a foundational belief.
However, when you draw a triangle on a curved surface, the sum of the angles do not add up to 180 degrees. Imagine drawing a triangle on the surface of a globe, with one corner at the north pole, and the other two corners on the equator. In this case the sum of the angles is not 180°. It turns out that the sum of the angles of any triangle is less than 180° if the geometry is hyperbolic, equal to 180° if the geometry is Euclidean, and greater than 180° if the geometry is elliptic.
In this sense is is it not therefore conceivable that mathematical knowledge is not always unchanging?
I'm currently reading a biography of Paul Dirac by Graham Farmelo called 'The Strangest Man'. Dirac was a British theoretical physicist who some regard as the successor to Einstein. Dirac was a genius. He was also probably autistic, according to Farmelo, and was not apt to pontificate on philosophical questions, or at least not until the end of his life. I get the impression from the book that, from a relatively young age Dirac held the view that any satisfactory explanation of the way the world is, in mathematical terms, needs to be elegant or beautiful because that is the way the world is. He would reject mathematical theories that he did not regard as beautiful largely on the grounds of their lack of aesthetic appeal.
Dirac therefore seems to have held a foundational type belief that the laws that govern the world are not random or inconsistent or inexplicable or ugly. He also believed that it was inconceivable that mankind would not continue to progress.
For all of these foundational type beliefs I remain largely skeptical because I want to ask the question "how do you know that it's true?"
This is a really interesting avenue. The "truth" of mathematics is something which I have been pondering. Is pure mathematics something that we discover or is it something that humans invent? If the former, then I can see how mathematics can be taken as a (natural) foundational type belief, if the latter then either coherentist or perhaps rational foundationalist.
If you were to ask most secondary school children who have studied mathematics at a basic level "Is it true or false that the sum of the angles in a triangle always add up to 180 degrees?" I suspect (hope?) most would say it was true. For them, this knowledge would be similar to 2+2=4 in terms of never changing, in a sense it would be a foundational belief.
However, when you draw a triangle on a curved surface, the sum of the angles do not add up to 180 degrees. Imagine drawing a triangle on the surface of a globe, with one corner at the north pole, and the other two corners on the equator. In this case the sum of the angles is not 180°. It turns out that the sum of the angles of any triangle is less than 180° if the geometry is hyperbolic, equal to 180° if the geometry is Euclidean, and greater than 180° if the geometry is elliptic.
In this sense is is it not therefore conceivable that mathematical knowledge is not always unchanging?
I'm currently reading a biography of Paul Dirac by Graham Farmelo called 'The Strangest Man'. Dirac was a British theoretical physicist who some regard as the successor to Einstein. Dirac was a genius. He was also probably autistic, according to Farmelo, and was not apt to pontificate on philosophical questions, or at least not until the end of his life. I get the impression from the book that, from a relatively young age Dirac held the view that any satisfactory explanation of the way the world is, in mathematical terms, needs to be elegant or beautiful because that is the way the world is. He would reject mathematical theories that he did not regard as beautiful largely on the grounds of their lack of aesthetic appeal.
Dirac therefore seems to have held a foundational type belief that the laws that govern the world are not random or inconsistent or inexplicable or ugly. He also believed that it was inconceivable that mankind would not continue to progress.
For all of these foundational type beliefs I remain largely skeptical because I want to ask the question "how do you know that it's true?"
Coherentism v Foundationalism contd.
My latest post follows from the following reply I received following yesterday's discussion:
"On the other hand, I suspect that so-called strong atheism can be a foundationalist belief since if I am not mistaken a strong atheist (in contrast to a weak atheist) would claim that he knows with complete certainty that God or some god does not exist."
This is a fair point. If an atheist were to say that they "know for sure" that God doesn't exist, it does seem to have a foundationalist flavour.
Are you saying that people who tend towards coherentism cannot be "strong atheists"? I think I would be happy with that position. I think the argument also works the other way round as well. People who who are fundamental in positive religious belief would probably by necessity be foundationalist in their knowledge about God.
I would accept that it is technically impossible to prove a negative and, in that sense, I wouldn't regard my atheism as "fundamentalist". I do think it is "true" that God doesn't exist, but I would accept that it is not technically possible to prove. I think my disbelief in God or Gods is not based on any foundational beliefs, i.e. ones that we obtain non-inferentially.
A possible philosophical argument would run as follows:
If my approach to knowledge is based on coherentism not foundationalism, then should someone come up with an explanation for God(s) that made sense and was coherent and supported by some evidence then I would happily change my position. Until they do, I will continue to believe that the statement that "God doesn't exist" is true.
Perhaps it would be useful to read some Kant at this stage because I have a nagging suspicion that, whilst I have just admitted the possibility of my belief changing, it is not that simple....
For me to believe in the existence of God I would need to do some major rebuilding of my core beliefs about the world. This is perhaps why I come across as being "fundamentalist". I am almost entirely convinced that God doesn't exist, so changing my mind on this fact would require quite a seismic shift in the way I look at the world. It may in fact be the case that the glue of coherence that binds my beliefs together is so strong that it couldn't conceivably be broken.
No doubt the religious amongst us will object to being labelled as (by definition) either "fundamentalist" or "incoherent". That is not what I am saying. I think it is quite possible for people to base their belief in God on a coherentist approach. They could infer the existence of God based on what they perceive to be the evidence, in a way that was coherent to them.
"On the other hand, I suspect that so-called strong atheism can be a foundationalist belief since if I am not mistaken a strong atheist (in contrast to a weak atheist) would claim that he knows with complete certainty that God or some god does not exist."
This is a fair point. If an atheist were to say that they "know for sure" that God doesn't exist, it does seem to have a foundationalist flavour.
Are you saying that people who tend towards coherentism cannot be "strong atheists"? I think I would be happy with that position. I think the argument also works the other way round as well. People who who are fundamental in positive religious belief would probably by necessity be foundationalist in their knowledge about God.
I would accept that it is technically impossible to prove a negative and, in that sense, I wouldn't regard my atheism as "fundamentalist". I do think it is "true" that God doesn't exist, but I would accept that it is not technically possible to prove. I think my disbelief in God or Gods is not based on any foundational beliefs, i.e. ones that we obtain non-inferentially.
A possible philosophical argument would run as follows:
If my approach to knowledge is based on coherentism not foundationalism, then should someone come up with an explanation for God(s) that made sense and was coherent and supported by some evidence then I would happily change my position. Until they do, I will continue to believe that the statement that "God doesn't exist" is true.
Perhaps it would be useful to read some Kant at this stage because I have a nagging suspicion that, whilst I have just admitted the possibility of my belief changing, it is not that simple....
For me to believe in the existence of God I would need to do some major rebuilding of my core beliefs about the world. This is perhaps why I come across as being "fundamentalist". I am almost entirely convinced that God doesn't exist, so changing my mind on this fact would require quite a seismic shift in the way I look at the world. It may in fact be the case that the glue of coherence that binds my beliefs together is so strong that it couldn't conceivably be broken.
No doubt the religious amongst us will object to being labelled as (by definition) either "fundamentalist" or "incoherent". That is not what I am saying. I think it is quite possible for people to base their belief in God on a coherentist approach. They could infer the existence of God based on what they perceive to be the evidence, in a way that was coherent to them.
Friday, May 11, 2012
Descartes' epistemology
I would like to comment on the question of whether I would reject Descartes' epistemology based on the failure of his individual arguments or on the overall approach he takes to epistemology.
Having looked a bit further into the foundationalism vs. coherentism debate, I am most convinced by the rejection of foundationalism which argues that the acquisition of knowledge isn't a linear process. Under this approach, knowledge is not obtained by a chain of inferential reasoning which needs a non-inferential starting point. This linear process seems to be very much the approach that Descartes takes, he wants to follow the chain back to beliefs that are indubitable by virtue of being so clear and distinct.
The alternative view which most strikes a chord with me is the the "holistic" view of knowledge. Neurath's boat metaphor expresses this beautifully - by which our beliefs are analogous to a ship which requires continuous replacement of any worn or broken parts to remain seaworthy.
Presumably philosophers have much bigger and better maintained ships than non-philosophers!
Despite being a fan of Russell, I am not convinced by the acquaintance argument for non-inferential belief. I would reject it on two grounds. Firstly, I don't believe that this gives us enough of a basis for developing the infinite number of justified beliefs that we hold. Secondly, I'm not sure it even makes sense to refer to the kind of knowledge that we get by acquaintance as true in a philosophical sense.
Having looked a bit further into the foundationalism vs. coherentism debate, I am most convinced by the rejection of foundationalism which argues that the acquisition of knowledge isn't a linear process. Under this approach, knowledge is not obtained by a chain of inferential reasoning which needs a non-inferential starting point. This linear process seems to be very much the approach that Descartes takes, he wants to follow the chain back to beliefs that are indubitable by virtue of being so clear and distinct.
The alternative view which most strikes a chord with me is the the "holistic" view of knowledge. Neurath's boat metaphor expresses this beautifully - by which our beliefs are analogous to a ship which requires continuous replacement of any worn or broken parts to remain seaworthy.
Presumably philosophers have much bigger and better maintained ships than non-philosophers!
Despite being a fan of Russell, I am not convinced by the acquaintance argument for non-inferential belief. I would reject it on two grounds. Firstly, I don't believe that this gives us enough of a basis for developing the infinite number of justified beliefs that we hold. Secondly, I'm not sure it even makes sense to refer to the kind of knowledge that we get by acquaintance as true in a philosophical sense.
Foundationalism v Coherentism
On the whole I am tending more and more towards coherentism and to challenge this position I have been trying to think of any truths that I would regard as foundational.
The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy defines foundationalism as "The foundationalist's thesis in short is that all knowledge and justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of non-inferential knowledge or justified belief."
One argument for foundationalism is given as the infinite regress of non-inferential belief:
"If all justification were inferential then for someone S to be justified in believing some proposition P, S must be in a position to legitimately infer it from some other proposition E1. But E1 could justify S in believing P only if S were justified in believing E1, and if all justification were inferential the only way for S to do that would be to infer it from some other proposition justifiably believed, E2, a proposition which in turn would have to be inferred from some other proposition E3 which is justifiably believed, and so on, ad infinitum. But finite beings cannot complete an infinitely long chain of reasoning and so if all justification were inferential no-one would be justified in believing anything at all to any extent whatsoever. This most radical of all skepticisms is absurd (it entails that one couldn't even be justified in believing it) and so there must be a kind of justification which is not inferential, i.e., there must be non-inferentially justified beliefs which terminate regresses of justification."
I don't accept this argument. I believe that our way of understanding the world is built up from inference. As we mature, we begin to understand a logical and consistent framework in which we can assess evidence and reason through a test of coherence. We begin to understand language in terms of what we mean by true or probable or tautologous and this is done using coherentism as the key measure, not any foundational beliefs.
I would also support the argument against foundationalism that states that once we get past “self-referential” propositions, propositions whose very subject matter encompasses the fact that they are believed, it is hard to come up with uncontroversial examples of infallible beliefs.
I'm still looking for a convincing argument for foundationalism and would welcome any suggestions.
The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy defines foundationalism as "The foundationalist's thesis in short is that all knowledge and justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of non-inferential knowledge or justified belief."
One argument for foundationalism is given as the infinite regress of non-inferential belief:
"If all justification were inferential then for someone S to be justified in believing some proposition P, S must be in a position to legitimately infer it from some other proposition E1. But E1 could justify S in believing P only if S were justified in believing E1, and if all justification were inferential the only way for S to do that would be to infer it from some other proposition justifiably believed, E2, a proposition which in turn would have to be inferred from some other proposition E3 which is justifiably believed, and so on, ad infinitum. But finite beings cannot complete an infinitely long chain of reasoning and so if all justification were inferential no-one would be justified in believing anything at all to any extent whatsoever. This most radical of all skepticisms is absurd (it entails that one couldn't even be justified in believing it) and so there must be a kind of justification which is not inferential, i.e., there must be non-inferentially justified beliefs which terminate regresses of justification."
I don't accept this argument. I believe that our way of understanding the world is built up from inference. As we mature, we begin to understand a logical and consistent framework in which we can assess evidence and reason through a test of coherence. We begin to understand language in terms of what we mean by true or probable or tautologous and this is done using coherentism as the key measure, not any foundational beliefs.
I would also support the argument against foundationalism that states that once we get past “self-referential” propositions, propositions whose very subject matter encompasses the fact that they are believed, it is hard to come up with uncontroversial examples of infallible beliefs.
I'm still looking for a convincing argument for foundationalism and would welcome any suggestions.
Monday, May 7, 2012
Descartes - stages of doubt
Week two's topic is knowledge (continues for week three also) and we start by reading chapter 1 of Blackburn and then Chapters 1 and 2 of Guttenplan et al. The first set task was not particularly enlightening so our tutor has set some alternative questions. My initial thoughts are as follows:
(i) Examine the various stages of doubt in Descartes' full argument. Say whether you think each stage or kind of doubt is a reasonable one.
(ii) if you think it is reasonable, support your position with examples and an argument.
(ii) if you think it is unreasonable, support your position with counter-examples and an argument.
Firstly, Descartes states that as a child he believed things which have subsequently been shown to be untrue - this establishes the possibility that so-called knowledge may be based on unsound foundations.
Descartes then explains that it is not possible to doubt everything, but this is not necessary, he only needs to establish that some things cannot be known for certain to call into question some fundamental beliefs. Unless something is "completely certain and indubitable" it can be doubted.
Next, Descartes explores what, if anything, we can know that cannot be doubted. He does this by introducing a number of possible reasons why we might think that some beliefs are not completely certain and indubitable. The steps are:
1. We are sometimes deceived by our senses therefore we cannot be sure that we are not being deceived at any particular time.
I think this is a flawed argument. Whilst it is true that at any one time we may be deceived by our senses, i.e. under an illusion or misapprehension, in the vast majority of these cases we subsequently understand what leads to the illusion or misapprehension. So for me, this argument fails on a metaphysical level. If I sense something that is 'impossible', i.e. does not accord with my understanding of the world, then I don't really believe it is true, i.e. I am not 'taken in' and I believe that there must be a rational explanation. Admittedly there are some things which we cannot explain, but this is not the same as accepting that we are actually deceived by our senses and believe things that are 'impossible'.
2. Mad people believe things that are not true
Descartes rejects this argument himself as he is confident that he isn't mad.
3. Dreaming can lead to deceptive experiences and we cannot be sure if we are awake or dreaming at any particular time.
I reject this as a reason for doubting all knowledge since my experience of dreaming is very different from my experience of being awake. When I wake up I can tell the difference.
Nevertheless, the dreaming argument does have a lot of philosophical merit and very neatly challenges our notion of existence. I accept that in the strictest sense we cannot prove that we aren't dreaming at any particular time or even that the whole of life isn't a dream and in this respect the argument is an important step in any serious attempt to enquire into what we know about existence.
My initial reaction however is to say that we have no indication that it is true that everything is just a kind of dream. It seems to be such a remote possibility that it isn't very helpful in understanding the way the world is. Unless Descartes can provide some support for why we should believe that everything is a dream, in the form of a coherent argument that makes sense, then the natural reaction to this argument is to reject it.
4. We cannot rely on God's omnipotence and goodness to ensure that we are not deceived as it is apparent that we are sometimes deceived.
I agree with this. If there is a God then it seems clear that he hasn't arranged things so that we are never deceived or under misapprehensions, at least in the sense that Descartes is using "deceived".
From a personal perspective I don't have the remotest concept of what 'God' could be, so to base any argument on what 'God' does or doesn't do is literally nonsensical.
5. We cannot be sure that a malicious demon is not deceiving us while we are awake.
As with the dreaming argument, I think we can see that logically this has something going for it, but on a personal level I don't believe in malicious demons so I would reject it as being impossible. For me to accept this argument it seems to me that I would need to admit the existence of malicious demons first.
Give your over-all opinion on Descartes' requirement for certainty in order for us to claim that we are justified in believing something about the world.
Do you think he is being reasonable?
Finally, what do you think of the cogito argument?
Whilst I don't think Descartes' arguments in favour of doubting everything are bullet-proof, I do very much admire the philosophical method which he sets out. Descartes' insistence that truth must be certain and indubitable is a valuable yard-stick and his clarity of thought and willingness to 'start from the beginning' is admirable.
I have found this exercise very challenging. Descartes arguments are difficult to reject outright. Although on the whole I tend to reject his conclusions, the method by which he constructs his arguments is clever and not entirely unconvincing.
The cogito marks a major stepping-stone in philosophy. Like many others, I tend to think that Descartes stretches the argument too far. Whilst I accept that "there is thinking going on" is true, the question remains what does Descartes mean by "I".
(i) Examine the various stages of doubt in Descartes' full argument. Say whether you think each stage or kind of doubt is a reasonable one.
(ii) if you think it is reasonable, support your position with examples and an argument.
(ii) if you think it is unreasonable, support your position with counter-examples and an argument.
Firstly, Descartes states that as a child he believed things which have subsequently been shown to be untrue - this establishes the possibility that so-called knowledge may be based on unsound foundations.
Descartes then explains that it is not possible to doubt everything, but this is not necessary, he only needs to establish that some things cannot be known for certain to call into question some fundamental beliefs. Unless something is "completely certain and indubitable" it can be doubted.
Next, Descartes explores what, if anything, we can know that cannot be doubted. He does this by introducing a number of possible reasons why we might think that some beliefs are not completely certain and indubitable. The steps are:
1. We are sometimes deceived by our senses therefore we cannot be sure that we are not being deceived at any particular time.
I think this is a flawed argument. Whilst it is true that at any one time we may be deceived by our senses, i.e. under an illusion or misapprehension, in the vast majority of these cases we subsequently understand what leads to the illusion or misapprehension. So for me, this argument fails on a metaphysical level. If I sense something that is 'impossible', i.e. does not accord with my understanding of the world, then I don't really believe it is true, i.e. I am not 'taken in' and I believe that there must be a rational explanation. Admittedly there are some things which we cannot explain, but this is not the same as accepting that we are actually deceived by our senses and believe things that are 'impossible'.
2. Mad people believe things that are not true
Descartes rejects this argument himself as he is confident that he isn't mad.
3. Dreaming can lead to deceptive experiences and we cannot be sure if we are awake or dreaming at any particular time.
I reject this as a reason for doubting all knowledge since my experience of dreaming is very different from my experience of being awake. When I wake up I can tell the difference.
Nevertheless, the dreaming argument does have a lot of philosophical merit and very neatly challenges our notion of existence. I accept that in the strictest sense we cannot prove that we aren't dreaming at any particular time or even that the whole of life isn't a dream and in this respect the argument is an important step in any serious attempt to enquire into what we know about existence.
My initial reaction however is to say that we have no indication that it is true that everything is just a kind of dream. It seems to be such a remote possibility that it isn't very helpful in understanding the way the world is. Unless Descartes can provide some support for why we should believe that everything is a dream, in the form of a coherent argument that makes sense, then the natural reaction to this argument is to reject it.
4. We cannot rely on God's omnipotence and goodness to ensure that we are not deceived as it is apparent that we are sometimes deceived.
I agree with this. If there is a God then it seems clear that he hasn't arranged things so that we are never deceived or under misapprehensions, at least in the sense that Descartes is using "deceived".
From a personal perspective I don't have the remotest concept of what 'God' could be, so to base any argument on what 'God' does or doesn't do is literally nonsensical.
5. We cannot be sure that a malicious demon is not deceiving us while we are awake.
As with the dreaming argument, I think we can see that logically this has something going for it, but on a personal level I don't believe in malicious demons so I would reject it as being impossible. For me to accept this argument it seems to me that I would need to admit the existence of malicious demons first.
Give your over-all opinion on Descartes' requirement for certainty in order for us to claim that we are justified in believing something about the world.
Do you think he is being reasonable?
Finally, what do you think of the cogito argument?
Whilst I don't think Descartes' arguments in favour of doubting everything are bullet-proof, I do very much admire the philosophical method which he sets out. Descartes' insistence that truth must be certain and indubitable is a valuable yard-stick and his clarity of thought and willingness to 'start from the beginning' is admirable.
I have found this exercise very challenging. Descartes arguments are difficult to reject outright. Although on the whole I tend to reject his conclusions, the method by which he constructs his arguments is clever and not entirely unconvincing.
The cogito marks a major stepping-stone in philosophy. Like many others, I tend to think that Descartes stretches the argument too far. Whilst I accept that "there is thinking going on" is true, the question remains what does Descartes mean by "I".
Thursday, May 3, 2012
Is philosophy dead?
This post is in response to Krauss' interview published in the Atlantic:
Has Physics Made Philosophy and Religion Obsolete?
For Krauss to claim that Russell was really a mathematician and not a philosopher I think is wrong. I have read quite a lot of philosophy by Russell, if you look at his bibliography philosophy takes up the majority of his writing. Russell was both a philosopher and a mathematician as well as being an historian, a political activist, a social commentator and much more besides.
Krauss also implies that Russell was wrong on some key points. Whilst this is undoubtedly true, that doesn't in any way make him a bad mathematician or a bad philosopher. It's the very nature of enquiry that as our understanding improves we are likely to be proved wrong. Russell helped us move forward and contributed more than very many people. Krauss is an intellectual midget compared to Russell and could do well to learn some humility.
I'm also not sure that I can agree that the media should carry the blame for the neutrinos travelling faster than light 'incident'. The problem was that a measuring device was faulty as it hadn't been screwed in to the correct tolerance. The physicists published results which, if true would have thrown a lot of physics in chaos - one of the flying sheep that we discussed earlier.
The problem with physicists is that a lot of them would kill their grannies to get a Nobel Prize. They publish too quickly, because the only way to get a Nobel Prize is to be the first, so adopting a blunderbuss approach to academic papers can mean that although 99.9% of the time they are completely wrong, occasionally they chance upon something that turns out to be true and get credit for it. This is truly moronic behaviour in my opinion.
On the whole I think physicists can often benefit from working alongside philosophers and Krauss' attitude is both condescending and rude. He should learn some manners.
Has Physics Made Philosophy and Religion Obsolete?
For Krauss to claim that Russell was really a mathematician and not a philosopher I think is wrong. I have read quite a lot of philosophy by Russell, if you look at his bibliography philosophy takes up the majority of his writing. Russell was both a philosopher and a mathematician as well as being an historian, a political activist, a social commentator and much more besides.
Krauss also implies that Russell was wrong on some key points. Whilst this is undoubtedly true, that doesn't in any way make him a bad mathematician or a bad philosopher. It's the very nature of enquiry that as our understanding improves we are likely to be proved wrong. Russell helped us move forward and contributed more than very many people. Krauss is an intellectual midget compared to Russell and could do well to learn some humility.
I'm also not sure that I can agree that the media should carry the blame for the neutrinos travelling faster than light 'incident'. The problem was that a measuring device was faulty as it hadn't been screwed in to the correct tolerance. The physicists published results which, if true would have thrown a lot of physics in chaos - one of the flying sheep that we discussed earlier.
The problem with physicists is that a lot of them would kill their grannies to get a Nobel Prize. They publish too quickly, because the only way to get a Nobel Prize is to be the first, so adopting a blunderbuss approach to academic papers can mean that although 99.9% of the time they are completely wrong, occasionally they chance upon something that turns out to be true and get credit for it. This is truly moronic behaviour in my opinion.
On the whole I think physicists can often benefit from working alongside philosophers and Krauss' attitude is both condescending and rude. He should learn some manners.
Philosophy v Science
I was struck by Russell's claim that, unlike science, "utility does not belong to philosophy".
The reason science has progressed so quickly is that we generally see the benefits that accrue. The resources put into philosophy are minuscule in comparison to science.
What is interesting to me, as a taxpayer, is how the scientists at Cern managed to persuade governments to hand-over such huge amounts of funding to investigate further theoretical physics. I'm interested to know if the Higgs Boson exists, but personally I'm not willing to bankrupt myself to find the answer! How come this branch of physics, which may well produce no material benefits at all, is suddenly receiving so much government support?
I would also argue that the importance or prominence of philosophy has declined in recent decades in relation to other academic pursuits. This may in part be due to the general "dumbing down" of the media in general. When I look back at television in the 1950s - 1980s, the BBC used to frequently broadcast programmes which benefited from the input of some of the greatest minds. Nowadays, all we seem to get is wall-to-wall "entertainment" with a few science programmes which are so dumbed-down as to be unwatchable.
As an aside, I highly recommend Cosmos by Carl Sagan and Civilisation by Kenneth Clark, both available from Amazon.
The reason science has progressed so quickly is that we generally see the benefits that accrue. The resources put into philosophy are minuscule in comparison to science.
What is interesting to me, as a taxpayer, is how the scientists at Cern managed to persuade governments to hand-over such huge amounts of funding to investigate further theoretical physics. I'm interested to know if the Higgs Boson exists, but personally I'm not willing to bankrupt myself to find the answer! How come this branch of physics, which may well produce no material benefits at all, is suddenly receiving so much government support?
I would also argue that the importance or prominence of philosophy has declined in recent decades in relation to other academic pursuits. This may in part be due to the general "dumbing down" of the media in general. When I look back at television in the 1950s - 1980s, the BBC used to frequently broadcast programmes which benefited from the input of some of the greatest minds. Nowadays, all we seem to get is wall-to-wall "entertainment" with a few science programmes which are so dumbed-down as to be unwatchable.
As an aside, I highly recommend Cosmos by Carl Sagan and Civilisation by Kenneth Clark, both available from Amazon.
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